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Preface 
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed, and 
how does the implementation of such agreements influence their effectiveness? These are 
the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments (IEC)." 
Virtually all international environmental commitments must be "domesticated," i.e., 
tranformed into domestic rules before they can affect the individuals, firms and 
organizations which international environmental agreements ultimately aim to influence. 
In this paper, Kal Raustiala describes and compares the legal and administrative processes 
by which six OECD countries (France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) transform their international obligations into domestic 
law. There are differences in the extent to which these countries include the exact text 
and terms of international obligations in the legal acts that give them force in domestic 
law. The countries vary enormously in their political philosophy toward international 
law: some give international commitments primacy over domestic law, while others 
protect legislation that implements international commitments from being overturned by 
later domestic legislation. The many differences lead to several hypotheses about 
expected levels of implementation and compliance in these six countries, which Raustiala 
explores. 
Despite the differences, the behavior of the countries in practice appears to be more 
uniform. This may reflect the fact that all the countries insulate the making and 
implementing of foreign policy within the executive. The author explores the extent to 
which this discretion varies across the six countries, and how it interacts with the 
constitutional and political styles of implementing international commitments into 
domestic law. 
Kal Raustiala began the paper while participating in IIASA's Young Scientists 
Summer Program in the summer of 1994. On the basis of his work he was awarded the 
Peccei Scholarship, which financed a return visit to the IEC project the following year. 
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Abstrac t  
International commitments generally become binding domestic law through a complex process of 
"domestication" or transformation. Without this process, international commitments frequently 
lack force or even meaning at the national level, where implementation actually takes place. This 
paper explores the legal process of implementation and examines how international commitments 
are transformed into domestic law in six OECD nations: the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, and 
the Netherlands. To the degree that institutional design affects the output of complex 
organizations (e.g. governments), the variations in the process of domestication should affect 
compliance with and the implementation of international commitments. The rules of ratification, 
interpretation, judicial challenge, and the priority or ranking of treaty commitments vis-a-vis 
ordinary statutory law are all surveyed and found to vary widely. These factors appear to interact 
in complex ways. In addition to some simple hypotheses derived from the institutional variations 
uncovered, three main conclusions emerge: formal institutional rules appear in practice to be 
substantially modified and/or elaborated by informal rules and methods; the complexity of both 
formal rules and actual practice in the domestication of international agreements raises doubts 
about the importance--and the ascertainability--of legality regarding international commitments; 
and, these first two conclusions are likely to become less certain over time as the insulation of the 
executive in foreign affairs--which is a major underlying cause of these conclusions--decreases in 
response to changes in the nature and scope of international law. 
I would like to acknowledge the helpful assistance and commentary of Dan Bodansky, Abram 
Chayes, Robert Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter, David Victor, and Jacob Werksman, as well as 
the financial support of the US NMO for IIASA. 
To fulfil its task, international law has to turn continously to domestic law. 
Without the latter it is in many respects utterly impotent. It is like a field marshal who only 
issues his orders to the commanding officers of the army and cannot achieve his aims unless the 
generals, in keeping with his instructions, in turn issue orders to their subordinates. 
If the generals fail to do this, the field marshal will lose the battle. And just as the field 
marshal's order gives rise to further orders by his subordinates, similarly a single rule of 
international law brings about a number of rules of domestic law, all pursuing the same end: 
to implement international law within the domestic framework of States. 
Heinrich Triepel 
(from a lecture at the Hague Academy, 1923)~ 
I Introduction 
This working paper explores the structure and process of "domesticating" international treaty 
~ommitments.~ By domestication I refer to the process by which formal international commitments 
become legally binding on the relevant domestic actors; typically, through codification in national 
or "municipal" law. Specifically, this paper explores in six cases cross-national institutional 
variations in this process--and in the rules of interpretation and judicial review--in an attempt to 
unearth design features that may inhibit, enhance, or shape compliance and implementation. Its 
goal is to describe, in language that is accessible to the lay reader, the institutional variations that 
exist, to explore their relation to state behavior, and to assess the importance of this field of 
research to the issue of effectiveness and implementation of international commitments. While the 
focus is on environmental agreements the issues are discussed in a general way wherever possible. 
Particular attention will be paid to: 
constitutional rules for ratification; 
requirements for action by the legislature; e.g. which sorts of treaty commitments require special 
enabling legislation, and which take "direct effect"?; 
the status of treaty commitments vis-a-vis normal statutory law or constitutional provisions; e.g. 
which prevail in a conflict?; 
rules concerning interpretation; e.g. how are treaty commitments interpreted and who has the 
power to interpret them?; and 
rules of standing and participation rights in challenging actions undertaken (or not undertaken) 
pursuant to a treaty commitment. 
Cited in A. Cassese, "Modern Constitutions and International Law " Recueil des Cours 1985 I11 vol. 192; pg. 
342. 
The scope of this paper is restricted to formal commitments, i.e. those embodied in written agreements 
between governments. Informal or tacit regimes are not addressed. See S Krasner, Regimes (Cornell U Press: 
1982). 
This study's focus on internal procedures for incorporating international commitments stems from 
a belief that such procedures have been systematically ignored or overlooked by much of the 
mainstream research on cooperation. International law and international relations--as research 
disciplines--have long been divided by their views on the sanctity, or binding force, of 
international commitments. While international lawyers have traditionally considered 
international commitments to be binding contracts, analogous to domestic contracts, international 
relations scholars--particularly Realists--have tended to view international commitments as loose 
promises which are often, to quote former German Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg, little more 
than "scraps of paper."3 
Despite this (perhaps overdrawn) fundamental difference, the two traditions share a 
perspective predicated on the primacy of states and of sovereignty. In this view, internally- 
undifferentiated4 "states" enter into contracts or regimes and then comply--or do not. The general 
mechanisms which determine compliance--whether normative pressures or calculated benefits--are 
basically the same in all states. Yet this assumed homogeniety of states is false; much more 
importantly, this assumption may mask important variables which help determine the shape and 
scope of compliance and implementation. The task of this paper is to explore the differences in the 
way states transform international commitments into domestic law, and to attempt to discern some 
implications for implementation and compliance. Throughout, the analysis will move from 
international to national law and back, with the transistions clearly marked. Six major OECD 
countries are surveyed: the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Given the 
complexity and broad scope of the project, the treatment is necessarily cursory and tentative.5 
I1 Comparative Domestication 
1. Treaties and executive arreements. 
International agreements are by definition made and undertaken by ~ t a t e s . ~  Once an international 
agreement is negotiated to closure and signed by the governmental delegations, a decision must be 
This [inlfamous remark is cited most recently in Abram and Antonia Chayes, "On Compliance" Internutional 
Organization 47:2 (1993); pg. 186. There is a nascent rapproachment between the two positions, as the Chayes 
point out. 
For structural realists, this is explicit; see Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979). Neo-liberal 
institutionalists accept this as well, and focus on the ways in which institutions structure incentives in powerful 
ways. The literature on democracies, e.g. the work of Michael Doyle, Steve Chan, and David Lake, does 
discriminate between differently-"constructed" states, but only in terms of war-proneness and aggression. 
Additionally, comprehensive and illuminating discussions of these issues (or at least their availability at 
IIASA) vary enormously, and as a result certain cases--most notably the US--receive more extensive attention 
than others (such as Italy). 
J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928). chap. VII. The European Union is a special 
case; see Martin Hession, "The Role of the EC in Implementation of International Environmental Law" Review 
of European Community and International Environmental Law (2,4 1993); and Nigel Haigh, "The European 
made--at the domestic level--about what type of agreement it is. Depending on type, different 
things will occur domestically. These distinctions of type are not, however, meaningful in 
international law. The distinction is a purely domestic one; international treaty law recognizes 
only "treaties" and does not distinguish them on their status in national legal systems or by their 
mode of creation and/or incorporation. 
Several types of international agreements exist: 
informal, "housekeeping," or executive agreements, which generally do  not require ratification; 
formal treaties, which generally do; within formal treaties there is the further 
distinction of: 
* self-enacting treaties; and 
* non-self-enacting treaties. 
The line between treaties and executive or informal agreements is not a bright one. Typically, more 
important agreements are accorded formal treaty status, and therefore subject to ratification. 
However, one of the most important agreements of the 20th century, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has never been accorded ratifiable treaty status and has instead 
operated under a "provisional protocol of application" for the past four decades7 There are many 
more executive agreements than t r e a t i e ~ . ~  Most of the major environmental accords, however, have 
been treated as treaties or protocols to treaties: CITES, the Montreal Protocol, the climate and 
biodiversity conventions, e t ~ . ~  All required ratification from the parties discussed here. As a 
result, I will focus on the formal treaty process in this paper. 
2. Ratification. 
Until ratification occurs, and the instrument of ratification (an official document) deposited 
with the relevant office, a state cannot be considered a party to the agreement, and the "contract" is 
Community and International Environmental Policy" International Environmental Affairs 3, 3 Summer 1991. 
Under US law, the states may undertake to enter into certain kinds of compacts, subject to approval by 
Congress, but not treaties. Similarly, the German Lander have concluded agreements of a specific nature with 
other nations (see below). 
For a discussion of this issue see John Jackson, The World Trading System (MIT Press: 1989); pgs. 34-7. 
The new World Trade Organization represents an explicit attempt to shore up the institutional and legal structure 
of the GATT regime. 
In the US, executive agreements can be further sub-divided into several categories: "Congressional-Executive 
agreements" which delegate power to the President ex ante via an authorizing statute; the same with an ex post 
approval statute; a purely presidential agreement; and some form of delegation mandated by a prior approved 
international agreement. For a discussion see John H. Jackson, "US Constitutional Principles, Foreign Trade 
Law and Policy" in Meinhard Hilf and E-U Petersmann, eds., National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law (Studies in Transnational Economic Law Volume 8: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers) 1993. 
In order: The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (1973); the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987; to the Vienna Convention on the same); the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (1992) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). 
incomplete.10 At this stage, we concerned solely with international law; under international law, 
ratification binds a state under the doctrine of pact sunt servanda: ("treaties are to be obeyed"). If 
the accord is subject to ratification, initial signature means no more than that the delegates have 
agreed on the text and are willing to refer it to their governments for further action.ll 
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter Vienna Convention) 
defines ratification as "the international act ... whereby a state establishes on the international 
plane its consent to be bound by a treaty." J.G. Starke elaborates 4 practical and philosophical 
bases for ratification12: 
States are entitled to have an opportunity to review instruments signed by their delegates before 
undertaking the obligations therein; 
by reason of sovereignty, a state should be able to withdraw from participation; 
Often a treaty calls for amendments or adjustments in municipal (domestic or national) law. The 
period between signature and ratification allows states time to pass the necessary enabling 
legislation. 
Democratic principles dictate that governments should consult representative legislative bodies 
(e.g. parliaments) before undertaking obligations. 
The ratification process therefore allows for more effective oversight, discussion, and 
informational exchange between a government, writ broadly, its agent (the negotiating team or 
delegation), and interested third parties, such as effected societal actors and organizations. The 
government seeks to ensure that its delegates carry out its wishes, and societal actors seek the same 
vis-a-vis the government. Hence, ratification is especially important as a means of ensuring that 
delegations do not commit states to unwanted agreements and as a means of injecting elements of 
democratic procedure into the conduct of foreign affairs.13 
3. "Acts of transformation." 
l o  As a general rule; see the Vienna Convention on International Treaties, article 34. 
JG Starke, Introduction to International Law (Buttersworths, 1989) chapter 16, passim. Some treaties are not 
subject to ratification, though these usually address less substantive matters. Executive agreements are an 
example; see Lipson, "Why are some international agreements informal?" International Organization (?) 
l2  Starke, pg. 454. 
13 On this issue see also "Discretion and Legitimacy in International Regulation" 
(Comment) Harvard Law Review 107 (March 1994). 
Ratification is only one part of the domestication process. The distinction made in section 1 
between self-enacting and non-self-enacting treaties has important ramifications for domestication. 
The terminology is actually American, but the concept is more universal: does the treaty require 
some domestic legislation to gain force or does it "automatically" gain force? Does it have "direct 
effect?" Here we have left the realm of international law and returned to domestic, or municipal, 
law. The rules governing this decision in part reflect prevailing philosophies of the legal order: 
"dualists" posit a fundamental discontinuity between the international and national systems of 
law; "monists" see law as one unbroken fabric extending from the international to the domestic 
spheres. If, under constitutional rules, the legislature must act--must legislate in some fashion, as is 
often the case--that legislation constitutes the "act of transformation." It turns the international 
commitment into domestic law. Such an act is usually required when the international accord 
regulates the behavior of domestic actors other than the government. 
It must be stressed that these concerns with transformation are wholly internal and domestic; 
back in the realm of international law, states present a smooth surface: once they have ratified, 
they are "legally" bound under international law.14 What happens afterwards is an internal 
matter. Even if a commitment is later determined to violate a nation's constitution, and thereby 
(perhaps) made void at the national level, the international obligation continues to exist.15 
Domestic law, however--backed by concentrated violence and shared societal norms--at least in 
practice if not in theory exerts a greater shaping force on government (and societal) behavior than 
does international law. It is for this reason that this paper explores the domestication of 
international commitments; it is the domesticated commitments that really matter for compliance 
and implementation. 
The significance of treaty ratification and the process of transformation varies across countries. 
The pathway from signature to ratification to transformation is briefly examined below in the six 
cases. 
A. The United States 
l 4  States are bound unless a fundamental change of circumstances occurs (the doctrine of "reb us stic stantibus") 
or, if the situations described in ft 11 below holds. 
l5 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does allow for retreat from obligations due to internal 
inconsistencies, but only in extreme circumstances. Article 46 reads: "A state may not invoke the fact that its 
consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a 
rule ofits internal law of fundamental importance." 
The US Constitution mentions treaties several times and in somewhat different ways.16 Article 
I1 grants the President the power "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." In such a case, the President mav 
ratify, but does not have to.17 In addition, agreements can be entered into through a majority vote 
of both houses of Congress, though the legality of this method is contested.18 Article I11 extends 
the judicial power of the Supreme Court to all cases arising under national law as well as under 
treaties. Article VI, in the "supremacy clause," dictates that all treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Finally, the states themselves--in contrast to the German Lander--are restricted from entering into 
treaties, alliances, or confederations, though they do retain some degree of international 
personality.19 In the US, as elsewhere, most international agreements are not Article 11-type 
treaties but rather executive actions pursuant to ordinary statute legislation (the vast majority of 
cases) or executive agreements undertaken without congressional approval.20 
One of the most important concepts in American treaty law--and elsewhere--is the distinction 
discussed above between "self-executing" and non-self-executing treaties. Originating in Foster & 
Elam v. Neilson (1829), Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion establishing this doctrine is worth 
quoting at length: 
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally 
effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra--territorial; 
but it is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. 
In the [US] a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of 
the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when 
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a 
l6 And while the Constitution does not specifically discuss general international law, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence indicates that it =be part of our law as well. See The Paquete Habana, 175 US 20 S. Ct 
(1990): "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administred by the courts of justice ..." 
Quoted in Alfred T. Goodwin, "International Law in the Federal Courts" California Western International Law 
Journal 20 (1989-1990). But see also Sei Fujii v. the State of California (38 Cal. 2nd. 722: 1952). 
l7 John Jackson, "United States," in  FG Jacobs and S Roberts, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law volume 
7 (Maxwell and Sweet: 1987) pg. 143 
l8 On this issue see the exchange between Laurence Tribe and Bruce Ackerman: Tribe, "GATT Implementing 
Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on commerce, Science, and Transportation, " 103rd Congress 
(1994), Ackerman and David Golove, "Is Nafta Constitutional?" 108 Harvard Law Review (1995); Tribe, "XX" 
Harvard Law Review (May 1995). 
l9 In Skirotes v. Florida (313 US 69, 77: 1941), the Supreme Court held that "Save for the powers committed 
by the Constituttion to the Union, the State of Florida has retained the status of a sovereign." 
20 Janis, pg. 78; Lipson, passim; and Loch Johnson, The Making of International Agreements (New York: 
NYU Press, 1987). 
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the 
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the 
Determining the self-executing nature of a treaty is a fine legalistic art (or act of sorcery), and "the 
substantial volume of scholarly writing on this issue has not resolved the c o n f u ~ i o n . " ~ ~  Where it is 
plain that the parties to an agreement contemplated future legislative action to achieve stated 
objectives, even if this is not explicitly stated, self-execution does not appear to apply.23 Most 
important treaties are not-self-executing--and it would appear, nearly all environmental treaties-- 
and they therefore require some form of legislative enactment. 
Since, by the supremacy clause, treaties are equivalent to the law of the land, states within the 
Union must abide by them. This is tempered, however, by the Constitution itself, which grants 
extensive powers (by omission) to the states. Treaties cannot generally infringe upon the 
sovereignty of the states. The Court, however, in Missouri v. Holland (1920) suggested (and has not 
reasserted since) that infringement is possible, in relation to an environmental case involving the 
transboundary migration of birds.24 
The supremacy clause by no means implies that international treaty commitments are superior to 
domestic statutes. In fact, there is virtual equivalence between the two. In the case of conflict 
where reconciliation is not possible, the general rule is the law later in time prevails.25 We will 
see that this is a common, though not universal, rule of jurisprudence regarding foreign affairs. Thus 
in the US international commitments can be abrogated by unilateral domestic legislation occurine ex 
t70Sf. The Constitution trumps treaty commitments as well; the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert 
held that 
the prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National 
Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or the Executive and the Senate 
combined.26 
21 27 US (2 Pet. ) 314 (1829). 
22 Jackson 1987, pg. 149. The Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit stated in US v. Postal that " the self- 
executing question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law." Ibid. See also Friedrich Kratochwil, 
"The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order" 
23 Sei Fujii v. the State of California (38 Cal. 2nd. 722: 1952) 
24 Though in Missouri v. Holland the Court ruled that it may be permissable for this to occur in some special 
circumstances involving, e.g. "a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude" which could be protected 
only through international cooperation. The cooperation in this case involved the protection of migratory birds. 
(252 US 416: 1920). 
25~his  is only applicable, however, to self-executing treaties: otherwise, the domestic enabling legislation, 
being domestic law, is identical to any other statute. 
To complicate matters, although US v Belmont held that executive agreements are the legal equal 
of Senate-approved treaties,27 it appears that executive agreements are & always the equal of 
treaties (or statutes) and can therefore be overturned more easily. In fact, it appears that even Drier 
legislation may trump executive agreements. Robert Hudec's study28 of GAIT-related caselaw 
shows in 14 separate cases in which GA'IT obligations were argued to prevail over federal 
legislation, this claim was never once upheld by the courts. This line of jurisprudence suggests that 
environmental executive agreements which are contained within formal treaties, such as technical 
amendments and the like, may similarly fail to come under the protection of the supremacy clause. 
A further distinction drawn explicitly in the US Constitution is between the power of the 
president to make treaties (Article 11) and that of the Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign 
nations" as well as "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises" (Article I). Trade 
agreements were traditionally the province of The lingering global depression in the 
1930's--exacerbated by congressional protectionism--led Congress to delegate to the president the 
power to conclude trade agreements.30 Trade agreements increasingly regulate standards and 
"technical barriers to trade," areas that directly impinge upon environmental regulation. US 
environmental commitments that are enshrined in trade agreements (e.g. the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and its attendent side agreements) fall under this set of rules. 
B. The United Kingdom 
The UK is a constitutional monarchy. The power to conclude and ratify international treaties is 
invested in the Crown (in practice the Cabinet), without any need for participation by the 
Parliament. However, Parliament alone has the power to incorporate treaties into English law, 
achieved through the passage of enabling legislation. The significance of this separation of powers 
is attenuated by the fusion of executive and legislative functions which is the hallmark of the 
British political system.31 
27 Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order" 
28 "The Legal Status of GAIT in the Domestic Law of the United States," in Meinhard Hilf, Francis Jacobs, 
and E-U Petersmann, eds., The European Community and GATT, 187 1986). 
29 With often ill-fated results, such as the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff. 
30 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. This delegation, however, is carefully circumscribed: inter 
alia, the authority of the president to negotiate trade agreements is limited to 3 years, congressmembers are 
frequently part of the negotiations, and a formal institutional machinary was established by which industries 
could express their concerns over pending negotiations. See Stephan Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of 
Hegemony: Explaining the [RTAA] of 1934," in GJ Ikenbeny, et al, [eds.] The State and American Foreign 
Economic Policy (Cornell U Press, 1988) and Carolyn Rhodes, Reciprocity, US Trade Policy, and the G A W  
Regime (Cornell U Press: 1993) chap 3. 
See Lijphart, Democracies (1984) ; Simon James, British Cabinet Government (Routledge: 1992) and Gary 
Cox, The Eficient Secret 
As a result, in all but the most unusual  circumstance^^^ the party in government, which by 
definition controls the Parliament, can pass the enabling legislation needed. Unlike the US, there 
is no prospect in Westminster-style democracy of divided government, e.g. control of the executive 
by one party and the legislature by another. Rather, a balance of power exists between the 
Cabinet--which is comprised of members of Parliament of the majority party--and the "back- 
bencher~": those members of the majority party not in the Cabinet. The executive emerges from the 
legislature, and is dependent upon its confidence. The two are tightly bonded by the glue of party 
affiliation and power, allowing the government to be confident in most cases of securing whatever 
legislation is necessary. The result is the executive has an enormous amount of power in the treaty 
process, and rarely needs to worry about gaining the necessary implementing legislation. 
In the UK, while treatymaking is a Royal prerogative?3 any treaty which 
involves any modification of the common or statute law; 
cedes British territory; 
effects private rights; 
increases the power of the European Parliament; 
vests new powers in the Crown; or 
imposes new financial obligations 
must receive parliamentary assent though an enabling Act of Parliament including, where 
necessary, the requisite changes in domestic law.34 The apparent classic statement regarding this 
dichotomy of powers, and still apt today, is by Lord Atkin: "[wlithin the British Empire there is a 
well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its 
obligations, if they entail alteration of existing domestic law, requires legislative action ... Unlike 
some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue 
of the treaty alone, have the force of law."35 This view echoes that of the American Justice 
Marshall quoted above. 
As is common, decisions regarding what type of treaty an agreement is--and therefore whether it 
is significant enough to justify legislative action--are taken by the executive; in this case, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth The treaty provisions themselves are not necessarily given 
the force of law in the implementing legislation. When a treaty has been thus implemented, it (e.g. 
32 Britain has on occasion employed a grand coalition government (most notably during WW 11) in which all 
the major parties take part. But typically, power is concentrated; to the victor go the spoils, and to the loser, 
opposition. 
33 Ian Sinclair and Susan Dickson, "National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom" in Leigh and 
Blakeslee, 1995; pg. 223. In addition, Bermuda and Hong Kong have the power to enter into limited 
international agreements. 
34 Starke; pg. 82 and Sinclair and Dickson, 230. 
35 Ibid. 229-30. 
36 Ibid; pgs. 227-8. 
its enabling legislation) takes precedence over any conflicting earlier legislation.37 However, 
where a statute contains provisions which are unambiguously inconsistent with an earlier treaty, 
the statute takes precedence. Thus--as in the US--treaty commitments can be abrogated bv acts of 
parliament occurring later in time. These rules are subject to some exception under the EU treaties 
(see below). In general, while Parliament is sovereign, its legal authority in matters covered by EU 
law appears subject to compliance with the latter.38 To date, all environmental agreements to 
which the EU has ratified as an entity have also been signed and ratified by the member states, 
though often at different times.39 
As a final aside, it is important to bear in mind that in the UK there is no written constitution, as 
is found in most democratic states (and all the other cases examined in this paper). Rather, an 
unwritten constitution based on practice, tradition, and a series of key texts exists. As such, there is 
less specificity and more flexibility surrounding the process of treaty-making and implementation 
in the UK than in the other cases. 
C. France 
Unlike the US or UK, which are both common law countries, France adheres to the civil law 
tradition. In civil law countries, the authority for the incorporation of treaty rules into domestic 
law is usually to be found in explicit constitutional provisions.40 Article 52 of the 1958 French 
Constitution empowers the President of the Republic to negotiate and ratify treaties. Article 55 
establishes the relationship between intemational commitments and domestic law: 
Treaties or intemational agreements regularly ratified or approved have, from the date of their 
publication, an authority superior to municipal [domestic] law on the basis of their reciprocity by 
the other state. 
Thus constitutionally, treatv commitments trumv domestic statutes in instances of conflict. This 
means that intemational treaty commitments take effect in France, and override domestic 
legislation, when "embodied in a decree signed by the French president and printed in the Official 
37 Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society (AC 459 8 476: 1960). 
38 See McCarthys Ltd. v. Smith 3 AER 325 [I9791 and R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame & others, 3 WLR 818 [1990]. In Factortame, writes Kinley, "[tlhe suspension of an Act of 
Parliament on the ground that it contrvened Community law enlightens us as to the true nature of the 
constitutional relations between the Parliament and courts of the United Kingdom and the legislative and judicial 
organs of the European Communty. There indeed exist prior examples of the introduction of legislation in 
response to adverse rulings of the Court of Justice, but never were they predicated on the revocation of domestic 
legislation." David Kinley, The European Convention on Human Rights: Compliance Without Incorporation 
(Dartmouth: 1993) pg. 5. 
39 Richard Benedick discusses the [ill-fated] attempt of the EC nations to ratify together the Montreal Protocol; 
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (Harvard U Press: 1991) 
40 Janis, pg. 81 
~ o u r n a l . " ~ ~  The treaty must therefore be published to be in effect, and most importantly the treaty 
obligations must be reciprocated by the other parties. Commitments are not enforceable 
domestically without being in force in other parties' domestic law: the "reciprocity clause." The 
reciprocity clause is the cause of significant consternation among some international lawyers 
(Cassese, for instance, terms it a "backward step").42 It is particularly troublesome in a 
multilateral treaty, where even a single derogation by one of the many parties would seem to 
invoke it, and thereby relieve France of the domestic legal obligation to comply. Moreover, 
determining reciprocity is beyond the powers of a court, and therefore, as will be discussed below, 
even more power accrues to the foreign ministry which will make the de t e rmina t i~n .~~  
Article 53 circumscribes the scope of international commitments ratifiable without statutory 
enactment. Parliamentary approval is needed for those treaties that 
modify French domestic law; 
affect the financial commitments of the state; or 
affect matters of considerable importance, such as peace, commerce, or interactions with 
international organizations.44 
In other words, nearly all international commitments of interest are subject to parliamentary 
approval; the interpretation of matters which require legislative approval has become more 
expansive over time.45 But again, unlike the US or UK, in France treaties--if duly ratified--trump 
any earlier or later statutory law.46 In a sense this provision of the French Constitution reflects the 
great power of the President granted in the 1958 Constitution; the executive can, via treaty law, 
introduce legislative changes of importance. Of course, these changes remain subject to 
Parliamentary approval. However, the final trump is again the executive's: "in practice, the 
Executive has total discretion" in determining which agreements are subject to legislative 
approval.47 
Moreover, in practice, this constitutional provision guaranteeing treaty superiority has not 
always, or even often, been followed. In France the juge adminitratif is charged with reviewing the 
administration of law. Historically, the juge administratif has ignored Article 55 and set domestic 
law and treaty commitments at equal levels, employing the later-in-time rule to adjudicate 
between conflicting treaty commitments and domestic statutes. So while treaty law remains 
41 Ibid., pg. 82. 
42 Cassese; pg. 403. 
43 On this see ibid, pgs. 405-7. 
44 Janis, pg. 82. 
45 Pierre Eisemann and Catherine Kessedjian, "National Treaty Law and Practice: France" in Monroe Leigh and 
Merrit Blakeslee, National Treaty Law and Practice (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 
1995); , pg. 6 
46 Starke, pg. 86. 
47 Eisemann and Kessedjian, pgs. 6-7. 
superior over prior domestic law, it sometimes loses out to subsequent, overriding, domestic law. In 
the ruling of the Conseil d'Etat in Syndicat general des fabricants de semoule de France, of March 12 
1968, the Conseil 
exercised its power to interpret the law in such a way as to limit any conflict between legislation 
and treaty, but when it came to a conflict that could not be interpreted away it gave preference to 
the most recent rule and took no account of the constitutional provisions giving treaties 
s ~ ~ e r i o r i t ~ . ~ 8  [emphasis added] 
In 1989, however, a new ruling by the Conseil d'Etat acknowledged the prevalence of treaty law 
over subsequent statutory law.@ 
To further complicate matters, a completely different line of jurisprudence has been followed by 
the juge judiciare. When trying to reconcile treaty commitments and subsequent legislation, the 
judiciare has tried, as most courts try, to find some way to reconcile the two or to demonstrate that 
the treaty is not really applicable, or was never intended to be applicable, to the case at hand. But 
this is not always possible; and in the landmark Jacques Vabre case, the Cour de Cassation upheld 
an EU rule over conflicting national legislation, invoking in the process the constitutional guarantee 
of treaty superiority contained in Article 55. This ruling was completely at odds with the rulings of 
the juge administratif. Thus in the final analysis, the superiority of treaty commitments in France 
seems to rest primarily on the judicial venue in which it is tested.50 And the reciprocity clause 
introduces a further somewhat stochastic element: a domestic statute may legitimately override an 
international commitments if reciprocity in full--which will change over time--does not exist.51 
Hence, Cassese notes that "no judicial body in France can actually pronounce upon the 
constitutionality of a law conflicting with a treaty...d2 But conversely, Eisemann and Kessedjian 
assert flatly (and more recently) that "it is now also acknowledged that treaties and international 
agreements prevail over subsequent statutes."53 
Treaty commitments cannot, however, violate the constitution itself. Article 54 states that if an 
"international commitment contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, the authorization to 
48 J.D. de la Rochere, "France," in FG Jacobs and S Roberts, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law volume 
7 (Maxwell and Sweet: 1987). 
49 Eisemann and Kessedjian, pg. 13 
50 More recently, it appears that the Conseil d'Etat has converged in its rulings with the rulings of the other 
courts; Elisabeth Zoller, "EEC Foreign Trade Law and French Foreign Trade Law" in Meinhard Hilf and E-U 
Petersmann, eds., National Constitutions and International Economic Law (Studies in Transnational Economic 
Law Volume 8: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers) 1993. 
51 The jurisprudence on this issue is somewhat confused. Cassese notes that French courts have very often 
ignored the reciprocity proviso, and have tended to place the burden of of invoking the clause on the parties. The 
presumption is generally in favor of reciprocity; e.g. a party must prove otherwise. Cassese describes the 
relevant cases; pgs. 407-8. 
52 Ibid, pg. 407. 
53 Eisemann and Kessedjian; pg. 13. They tend to take a formal view throughout, however. 
ratify or approve the commitment may be given only after amendment of the Constitution." 
Clearly, this is not an insignificant undertaking. The Conseil Constitutio~el, which is quasi- 
judicial body, makes the determination as to unconstitutionality. The President, the Prime 
Minister, or the Presidents of either chamber of the legislature may request a ruling on a treaty 
commitments constitutionality, but only before their promulgation.54 As a result, if a domestic 
statute is passed which would appear to mandate a derogation from an international commitment, 
ex post its constitutionality or unconstitutionality cannot be determined.55 
D. Italy 
Like the other domestic legal systems examined in this study, Italian law requires that 
ratification and acts of transformation occur before international treaty obligations become legally 
binding. Typically, a statute is enacted by the legislature which provides for the implementation 
of a treaty once it enters into force. Often this statute subsumes the act of ratification: in addition to 
providing for full implementation, it will authorize the president of the Italian Republic to ratify 
the treaty. The treaty itself appears in an appended schedule to the act. 
As a result, there is typically no implementing legislation which "recasts" the treaty 
commitments domestically, as is often the case in other nations. Instead, the treaty provisions are 
directly applied. These provisions have the same force as ordinary statutes. And, as in France, the 
US, and the UK, treaties may repeal prior statutes but can in turn be repealed by subsequent 
statutes. The same sorts of judicial gymnastics are often performed to avoid the unilateral 
abrogation of treaty commitments: courts take pains to interpret later law consistently with 
treaties, or consider treaties provisions to be in some way special cases, in an attempt to circumvent 
the conflict altogether. 
Italy also recognizes the distinction between self- and non-self-executing treaties. Here, as 
elsewhere, the line separating the two is not bright. The Court of Cassation found, for instance, 
that the 
norms of the European Convention on Human Rights-apart obviously from those provisions the 
content of which, after the use of habitual methods of interpretation, is to be considered so general 
that it does not express sufficiently specific rules--are directly applicable in ~ t a l ~ . ~ ~  
One interesting aspect of the Italian system is the provision for repeal of statutes by referenda. 
Here a bright distinction is drawn between treaties and ordinary statutes: statutes which 
54 Zoller, passim. 
55 Cassese, pg. 407. 
56 69 Riviste di Diritto internationale 143, at 145 (1986); cited in Gaja, "Italy," in FG Jacobs and S Roberts, 
The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law volume 7 (Maxwell and Sweet: 1987). 
implement treaties are expressly forbidden to be repealed via referendum by the constitution 
(Article 75:2). 
E .  The Netherlands 
The Netherlands, like the United Kingdom, is a constitutional monarchy. And, like the UK, 
treaties are a prerogative retained by the crown. In practice, all treaties are negotiated by the 
foreign minister, with the assistance of other ministers where relevant (e.g. the minister of the 
environment). 
All international agreements are subject to parliamentary approval. Occasionally, 
parliamentary approval is omitted in cases which are simple government-to-government 
arrangements, such as understandings between customs officials. These arrangements are codified in 
Article 91 of the 1983 constitution, which also discusses the issue of conflict between international 
commitments and constitutional rules: 
Any provisions of a treaty that conflict with the Constitution or which lead to conflicts with it 
may be approved by the Chambers of the States General [the legislature] as long as at least two- 
thirds of the votes cast are in favor. 
This constitutional provision is unusual, to say the least, and perhaps reflects and illustrates the 
importance of international law in the Netherlands--the home of both Hugo de Groot (Grotius) and 
the International Court of Justice. The parliament is the sole judge of the degree of constitutional 
conflict. A provision for tacit approval also exists: if neither chamber of the legislature issues a 
statement within 30 days of receiving an international agreement for review, the agreement is 
considered approved. 
The Dutch constitution also stipulates that treatv obli ations trump all national legislatiorl, 
both prior and subsequent to the treaty's enactment. This includes the constitution itself, for if a 
treaty is approved it has either been deemed not in conflict with the constitution, or, it has been 
approved by the requisite two-thirds majority of the parliament--in the process trumping the 
constitution. Unlike French courts, Dutch courts have actually upheld this rule, overturning 
legislation which was deemed to violate an earlier treaty obligation (the cited case involved tax 
law and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United ~ a t i o n s ) ~ ~  But the strength of 
this rule is, in the views of some analysts, diminished from its existence in the earlier, 1953/6 
Dutch constitutions8 
57 Court of Appeal, the Hague: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 1971, pg. 226; (cited in Henry 
Schemers, "Netherlands," in FG Jacobs and S Roberts, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law volume 7 
(Maxwell and Sweet: 1987) pg. 114. But see also Cassese, pgs. 409-1 1. 
58 Cassese, pg. 409-10. 
F. Germany 
Germany, like the US, is a federal system in which the sub-federal units have significant 
constitutionally-guaranteed powers. The German Constitution grants the power to conduct relations 
with foreign states to the federal government, specifically the President. The Lander, however, 
limited treaty-making powers in those realms in which they have competence to legislate.59 In 
practice, however, this is exercised very rarely, and must have the approval of the Federal 
government. Often Lander treaties concern environmental issues; typically, water resources or river 
management involving adjacent states.60 
While the executive is responsible for the negotiation of treaties, the legislature plays an 
important role and often members of the legislature attend major negotiations.61 Any treaty which 
effects the relations between the federal govemment and the Lander or which require legislation of 
some kind must receive the consent of the national legislature. However, it up to the relevant 
department, in conjunction with the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Justice and Interior, to decide 
whether a treaty should be submitted to the legislature. By Article 59 of the German constitution, 
approval must be in the form of a domestic law. This law is subject to the same rules which apply in 
any act of law-making; most importantly, this means that the Federal Council, which represents 
the Lander, can cast a veto. 62 The domestic implementing law both enables the president to ratify 
the treaty and make it binding on the international level and transforms the international 
commitment[s] into domestic law. But where the treaty commitments fall within the competence of 
the Lander, it is up to the Lander to incorporate the terms into their respective law. This occurs 
most often in cultural matters, and apparently rarely in environmental matters.63 
The federal legislation transforming an international commitment into domestic law has--by 
definition--the status of a federal statute and therefore takes precedence over all laws of the 
Lander. Like most of the other states examined in this study, later legislation prevails over treatv 
commitments. exce~ t  in certain instances detailed below. Interestingly, "general rules" of public 
international law, by Article 25, have a higher status than domestic statutes. But treaties are 
clearly not general rules of public law, and have not been considered so by German courts.64 
Precedence is given to treaty provisions under the German Constitution in the following issue- 
areas: 
59 Hans Treviranus and Hubert Beemelmans, "National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany" 
in Leigh and Blakeslee, 1995; pgs. 54-6. 
60 An example is the treaty between Switzerland, Austria, Bavaria, and Baden-Wurttemburg (1960) regulating 
the water quality of Lake Constance. 
61 Treviranus and Beemelmans; pg. 47. (Also describing the different roles of the President and the Chancellor 
in treaty negotiations). 
62 Though not on all treaties; see ibid, pg. 51. 
63 Jochen Frowein, "Germany," in FG Jacobs and S Roberts, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law volume 
7 (Maxwell and Sweet: 1987) pg. 63. 
64 Ibid. 
tax law; 
treatment of aliens; 
extradition; and 
matters of cooperation in criminal justice. 
In all other matters, the statute appearing later in time prevails. Of course, German courts attempt 
to avoid all instances of conflict through creative interpretation. The German legal system also 
recognizes the issue of self-execution. 
G. The European Union. 
All of the countries examined in this paper are part of the EU, except the US. As a result, it is 
important to explore the EU treaty-making powers, though they are in constant evolution and thus 
often quite murkily defined. Given this complexity, only the simplest treatment will be given here- 
-and only of those issues which are (relatively) uncontentious. 
To begin, the EU treaties themselves, by virtue of their constitutive character--they constitute or 
bring to legal life the entity of the EU--are quite special international instruments. The EU treaties 
as a result have been concluded under special provisions in the domestic laws of the member 
states.65 Their implementation is governed by constitutional standards rather than the normal 
standards of international law. These treaties contain provisions for the EU to engage in 
international treaty-making with third party states; generally, it is the Council of Ministers 
which authorizes and concludes negotiations, though the Commission actually conducts them. 
The original EEC treaty expressly granted Community competence to conclude international 
agreements only in commercial and trade matters, though early on the European Court ruled that 
the Community had such competence in any area governed by the Community internally 
(Commission v. Council, March 31 1 9 7 1 ) ~ ~  Eventually, this doctrine was extended into areas in 
which internal EU competence or jurisdiction existed but had not hitherto been used--in other 
words, in which no legislation had yet been promulgated. 
In most instances of interest--and in nearly all important international environmental agreements- 
-treaties with third party states are not concluded solely by the EU but rather by both the EU and 
the member states jointly: a "mixed agreement." Delimiting and describing this animal appears to 
be a subject of considerable controversy, and even EU officials themselves often present 
contradictory views on the scope of EU competence and jurisdiction in mixed negotiations.67 Parts of 
65 Judge Pierre Pescatore, "Treaty-making by the European Communities," in FG Jacobs and S Roberts, The 
Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law volume 7 (Maxwell and Sweet: 1987). 
66 Ibid, pg. 175. 
67 See Jackson, 1989, pg. 47; and Richard Benedick's account of this in the Montreal Protocol negotiations in 
Benedick,Ozone Diplomacy (Harvard University Press: 1991). 
a given agreement may fall under different rules. For example, most GAlT protocols are concluded 
by the Community alone, but certain specific protocols have used the mixed procedure.68 
Yet another murky area of EU jurisprudence is the relation between international obligations of 
the Community and contradictory domestic law. The European Court has, unsurprisingly, usually 
taken the view that domestic law must yield to EU law and that international treaty obligations 
are a pertinent source of EU law--and therefore overriding.69 But it is not clear that the member 
states--and particularly their legislatures--have promptly and completely abided by these rulings 
in all cases. In essence, this issue of priority is at the crux of the general EU debate, and it touches 
upon the critical issues of accountability, sovereignty, and subsidarity that so consume the 
Community and its members. 
111 Interpreting international commitments 
1. Why inter~retation matters. 
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, international treaties are contracts of a sort: states 
assume certain obligations and pledge to take certain actions, given a particular set of circumstances 
which may or may not be explicitly delineated in advance. In an international legal sense, 
regardless of the pathways of domestication described above, the commitments taken--if duly 
ratified--are sacrosanct. The guiding Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does grant certain 
escape clauses: breach may be legal if there is a fundamental change in circumstances (the doctrine 
of rebus sic stantibus) or a fundamental dichotomy between the commitment and domestic law. But 
in the main commitments are to be kept: pact sunt semanda . Of course, the international legal 
environment is not the domestic one. States can and do breach contracts, and there is no organized 
coercive means to stop them, short of war or some sort of trade sanction. 
States nevertheless try to avoid breach, but when they fail, they tend to do it ways that are 
legally j ~ s t i f i a b l e . ~ ~  Thus the US ignored the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua 
harbor-mining case not by asserting its hegemonic power, but rather by claiming that the court 
lacked jurisdiction. Such claims may just be masking or legitimizing rhetoric, or they may be the 
product of foreign ministries staffed predominantly by lawyers. Alternatively, they may be 
meaningful expressions and manifestations of the force of international law. This question cannot be 
answered here. 
68 Pescatore, pgs. 177-8. 
69 Pescatore provides a series of judgements along these lines, inter alia: Haegeman (1974), Kupferberg (1982); 
Rapides Savoyards (1984). See also Anne-Marie Burley (Slaughter) and Walter Mattli, "XX" International 
Organization ( 
70 On this extended topic see Francis Boyle, World Politics and Intemtional Low (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1985) 
Instead, I will assume, for the purposes of this paper, that while rhetoric or lawyerly 
bureaucratic practice play a role in driving state behavior, international legal prescriptions have 
some non-trivial independent force. International law is not timeless theater; it constrains 
governments in meaningful ways, and governments as a result take issues of law seriously when 
choosing between alternate courses of action. 
Interpretation thus matters because the commitments states take are often (sometimes purposely) 
vague or ambiguous, or are incomplete in the sense that they do not--and cannot-contain rules for 
all eventualities. All contracts are in this sense incomplete. If contracts were not, most attorneys 
would be superfluous: breach would be clear and recognizable to any arbiter. But breach of contract 
is rarely clear, because the world is constantly changing and new circumstances come into play 
which serve to alter the terms or referents of a contract. This same dynamic holds true for 
international commitments. Governments will interpret commitments in ways that are favorable 
for them (generally speaking) and when commitments prove or become onerous or when conflict 
ensues governments will seek ways to interpret the commitments in new ways-ways which lower 
the costs of compliance or allow them to renege altogether. Indeed, most international agreements 
are drafted to facilitate this process. Escape clauses, reservations, etc. are built in to treaties 
specifically to aid in (re) interpretation and breach, or to avoid the same. But interpretation often 
allows states to avoid something so dramatic as a reservation or withdrawal by redescribins the 
commitment in a particular fashion. The ambiguity of most international accords--often a result of 
compromise and contention--is thus perfectly suited to the artful interpretation and 
reinterpretation of commitments by governments. 
2. Comvarative interpretation. 
The interpretation of international commitments occurs in different ways in the different 
countries examined here. Generally, the rules or norms of interpretation used in a particular nation 
build upon the mode of interpretation employed more generally--when reviewing domestic statutes, 
for example. Below, I will briefly survey the process of interpretation in the six cases. 
A. The US 
One of the pillars of the US political system is the separation of powers principle. This 
principle yields important effects in the execution and interpretation of US foreign relations law. 
In general, US courts have granted broad deference to the executive in international affairs, either 
explicitly or through the corollary "political questions doctrine." In the Court's view, political 
questions are those that are non-justiciable by their "political" nature; they would lead, were the 
judiciary to engage them, to a violation of the separation of powers.71 The Court found in Curtiss 
-Wright v .  US (193617~ that the president held "plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international relations." This finding, coupled with the 
political questions doctrine, has lead the judiciary in the US to recoil from extensive intervention 
into foreign affairs. American courts have learned, in the judgment of Louis Henkin, 
to carry out their normal functions with due--I think sometimes undue--deference to the political 
branches. Deference is not only avowed but is made a principal of decision. The reasons for 
deference are not often articulated and are rarely examined, but high among them appears to be 
some sense that the governmental act in question may implicate the national interest in relation to 
other nations, if not national security, and that in foreign affairs the United States must "speak 
with a single voice" and that voice must be that of the experts, usually the executive branch.73 
This view of international affairs as turf upon which the judiciary may tread only carefully and in 
certain circumstances is balanced by the finding of Reid v .  Covert that the Constitution is as valid 
in foreign affairs as it is in domestic affairs.74 Judicial review of government actions pursuant to 
treaty commitments, however, is rarely invoked. There is furthermore no judicial protection 
against congressional action which violates an international commitment. While this reflects the 
dualist nature of American law--and the fact that US judges exist by virtue of the Constitution (and 
often and not by virtue of the international system--in part this is a function of the 
established rules of standing, which demand an "injury in fact" to an identifiable plaintiff as well 
as causation by the action in question.76 Furthermore, a host of other, lesser, criteria-- 
redressability, "ripeness," etc.--must be satisfied as well for a judgement to be rendered. These 
criteria are often hard to demonstrate in a case involving an international commitment. 
When the courts do engage in the interpretation of international commitments, US practice is 
somewhat distinctive. The ordinary meaning of the words used in a treaty is but one of the factors 
to be taken into account in interpretation. The prime objective of interpretation in US courts is to 
71 The origin of the doctrine is Baker v. Carr (369 US 186) 1962. "Prominent on the surface of any case held 
to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion ..." etc. 
etc. 
72 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.; 299 US 304 (1936) 
73 Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs (Columbia University Press, 1990) pg. 
70. 
74 Reid v. Covert; 354 US (1) 1957. 
75 All US courts other than the Supreme Court are entirely the creatures of Congress: Article I11 empowers the 
Congress to "from time to time" create lesser courts as they see fit. 
760n standing more generally see the excellent overview provided in Cass Sunstein, "What's Standing After 
Lujan: Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries,' and Article 111" Michigan Law Review (1992). "Lujan" refers to a recent 
Supreme Court ruling on the extraterritorial application of the Endangered Species Act, which--in the eyes of 
Sunstein and nearlyt all environmental organizations in the US--set a misguided and dangerous precedent for the 
right to attempt to enjoin the US from taking certain actions detrimental to the environment. 
ascertain the meaning intended by the contracting parties. That "intentu--to be determined by 
examination of drafting history (travaux preparatoires), statements, and preambular goals-- 
prevails over the precise language of the text has been repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme 
However, in recent years, led by Justice Scalia, the Court has moved away from broad 
readings of intent in purely domestic cases of statutory interpretation and favored an increasingly 
strict "four comers" approach. Thus, it may be the case that the Court will extend this shift to 
treaty interpretation as well. 
Probably more so than the judiciary, the body most involved in foreign affairs, aside from the 
executive, is the Senate. The Senate's role of "advice and consent" means that the President can 
only make a treaty as the Senate understood it and agreed to it. The Senate has on occasion 
explicitly declared its understanding of ambiguous treaty provisions by an express "understanding" 
in its resolution of consent.78 The Senate's understanding is then the US' understanding. While the 
President can later terminate a treaty that the Senate accepted, without its consent,79 the 
President is bound to uphold the original Senate interpretation while the treaty remains valid. 
In most cases of interest, however, the international commitments in question are not deemed self- 
executing and as a result have been incorporated into domestic law via an enabling statute (the "act 
of transformation"). This is true of nearly all major environmental agreements. The enabling 
statute is treated thereafter as ordinary law in all respects, though the inspiring treaty language 
usually has relevance for subsequent i n t e rp r e t a t i ~n .~~  The keeping of the international commitment 
becomes ancillary to the proper execution of the law; but in general judges appear to avoid 
controversy by interpreting the law in ways that do not violate the treaty language. Jn fact, this 
doctrine is incorporated into the most recent restatement of US foreign relations law.81 
Thus the separation of powers doctrine creates unique complexity in American foreign relations 
law. To summarize, I can only again quote Henkin: 
The President does not have to make a treaty even after the Senate gives its consent, and the 
President can terminate a treaty that has been made ... But if a treaty has been made and has not 
been terminated, the Senate is entitled to resist a presidential interpretation of a treaty that 
renders it effectively a treaty other than the one to which the Senate had consented ... Once a treaty 
is made, the Senate has no special authority in relation to it. The President later interprets the 
treaty for purposes of executing it. Congress--both houses--interprets the treaty for legislative 
purposes. Courts may interpret it for their purposes. The Supreme Court's interpretation of a treaty 
77 Jackson, 1987, pg. 165. See Air France v. Saks 3 Pet. 242 (1830), and the draft revised restatement of US 
foreign relations law, cited in ibid. 
78 Ibid. This discussion draws on that offered in pgs. 5 1-54 . 
79 According to the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The issue arose in the 
1970's when President Carter terminated a defense treaty with Taiwan in order to establish full relations with the 
PRC. Though several senators took this issue to the Court (Goldwater v. Carter, 444 US 996 (1979)) the Court 
did not resolve it. 
Jackson, 1992; pg. 315. 
81 Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the US ; cited in Jackson, 1992. 
made in deciding a case or controversy is authoritative for purposes of [US] law and is binding on all 
courts as well as on the political branches. 
To preview the other cases examined here, the most salient point in comparative terms is in fact 
this complexity. Many of the issues of deference to the executive in foreign affairs explored above 
are found (and even heightened) in the other states. In some, like the UK, this is not deference but 
the fact that international commitments are a Crown prerogative. In France, the reciprocity clause 
(see section II:4:D above) effectively removes French courts from an examination of French 
compliance with any international commitment. The US is thus marked by both greater complexity 
and less executive discretion in the making, keeping, and interpreting of international commitments. 
B. The UK 
Unlike the US, there is no real separation of powers in the UK. Indeed, the British political 
system is based upon the untrammeled--and untrammelable--sovereignty of Parliament in all 
legislative affairs, and, similarly, of the Crown in all foreign affairs: 
Parliament ... has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; 
and further, no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or 
set aside the legislation of ~ a r l i a m e n t . ~ ~  
As a result, English courts "recognize Parliament as being omnipotent in all save the power to 
destroy its own omnipotence."83 While the Crown--in reality the government of the day--makes 
all treaties and regulates all foreign affairs, treaties have no power or legal meaning domestically 
unless Parliament incorporates them into national law. Unlike in Italy, where treaties are often 
included verbatim in the implementing legislation, the British Parliament frequently recasts the 
language of an international commitment when domesticating it via an implementing statute. 
British courts in turn tend to look to the domestic legal instrument, rather than the inspiring treaty, 
whenever possible.84 The connection of these three principles and practices--the omnipotence of 
Parliament, the need for Parliamentary enabling legislation, and the frequenting recasting of 
international commitments in that legislation--creates a legal potential for non-compliance and 
unorthodox implementation greater than that found in the other cases. 
These specific practices also pose some difficulties in the interpretation of commitments. To 
begin with, the scope of judicial review in the UK is limited (see section IV below), generally to 
82 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed 1959) pgs. 39-40. 
83 Megarry V-C in  Manuel v. A-G [I9831 i ch 77 at 89, [I9821 3 AER 786, 795, cited in Fried1 Weiss, 
"Constitutional Law and Foreign Trade Law in the United Kingdom," in Meinhard Hilf and E-U Petersmann, 
eds., National Constitutions and International Economic Law (Studies in Transnational Economic Law Volume 
8: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers) 1993. 
84 Higgins, pg. 137. 
ultra vires--beyond the powers--cases.B5 If the differences in language between the enabling 
statute and the inspiring treaty text become meaningful--as has happenedB6--the courts will of 
course try to reconcile them. What happens if they cannot is not completely clear, but it appears 
that the domestic language will prevail. As Parliament is supreme, and there is no constitutional 
control of the Parliament, courts have no choice but to follow properly enacted statutes regardless of 
their adherence or lack thereof to international treaty commitments. The exception appears to be 
in the context of the EU; the Factortame case of 1990 in a limited sense placed EU law above UK 
law, though the extent of this ruling is also not clear. 
In general, then, acts of the government pursuant to foreign relations are not justiciable in Britain. 
The courts have stated that they will not "adjudicate upon acts done abroad by virtue of sovereign 
authority ... sit in judgment upon ...inq uire into ...," or "entertain questions concerning such acts."B7 
While review exists in terms of domestic law, this review is limited, however, by a focus on specific 
cases and the lack of any broad-based codification of administrative law analogous to the 
American Administrative Procedures ~ c t . ~ ~  Review tends to only address whether an agency acted 
within its delegated powers, and to ensure that certain common law rights are observed. Treaties, 
by virtue of being acts of state, are not a source of legal rights. Only the enabling legislation can 
play this role. 
C. France 
The French constitution makes little mention of sources of international law other than formal 
treaty conventi0ns.~9 As a result, interpretation of treaty obligations is oriented firmly around the 
text in question. The Counseil d'Etat, the juge administratif and the juge judiciaire in theory have 
the power to interpret. The Conseil Constitutionnel does not: its "control is reserved to acts of 
- 
85 On British administrative law see Susan Sterett, "Legality in Administration in Britain and the United States" 
Comparative Political Studies 25,2 (July 1992) and "Judicial Review in Britain" Comparative Political Studies 
26,4 (January 1994); Patrick Atiyah and Richard Summers, Fonn and Substance in Anglo-American Law (NY: 
Oxford University, 1987); Bernard Schwartz, Lions Over the Throne: The Judicial Revolution in English 
Administrative Law (New York: NYU Press, 1987), discusses the recent transformation in UK administrative 
law. Much of the "revolution" is in areas tangentially related at best to environmental regulation--in part 
because regulation is seen as something distinct from law. And in the key area of mandamus the revolution has 
barely taken hold; Schwartz, pgs. 103-4. 
86 Higgins gives an example concerning the International Tin Commission (headquartered in the UK), in which 
the commission owed money to English creditors and tried to invoke immunity via the original Headquarters 
agreement. The terms of the enabling legislation were slightly different, and the courts avoided by the question 
of whether the original treaty language or the enabling legislation prevails by interpreting the enabling 
legislation itself as providing immunity. pgs. 138-9. 
87 Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, [I9821 AC 888 at 932E, 933A, cited in Weiss, 1993, pg. 258. 
88 The closest analog is the Tribunals and Inquiries Act of 1958. 
89 The one place is the preamble. But it does distinguish between treaty, which are negotiated and ratified by 
the President, and "accords internationaux" which are negotiated by the government. In practice the significance 
of the distinction is unclear; see Eisemann and Kessedjian, pg. 2. 
Parliament. Executive and administrative regulations are outside the Conseil's control."90 Nor, 
apparently, does the Cour de   ass at ion.^^ In practice, French judges frequently refer to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs or to the European Court, if the case involves EU law. Originally, the 
administrative courts declared that they were not empowered to interpret treaties; in 1990 this 
view was overturned by the Conseil d'Etat and the court is no longer bound by the interpretation 
offered by the Ministry of Foreign ~ f f a i r s . ~ ~  As a general rule, or philosophical orientation, the 
French political system does not look favorably on judicial review; indeed, there is a "French 
rejection of judicial review and binding precedent."93 As in the UK, it is seen as an undemocratic 
imposition on the will of the people, as expressed in the output of their elected representatives. 
This view notwithstanding, interpretation does occur. An important distinction is drawn by 
French courts between cases or clauses addressing private interests, and those addressing the rules of 
international public order.94 Treaties addressing private interests can be interpreted by the courts 
directly. Treaties addressing public interests cannot, and are instead interpreted by the government 
itself (in practice the executive). Examples of public interests include the territorial extent of 
jurisdiction, issues of the international monetary system, and the power to make war (or peace). 
Treaties addressing private interests would include, among others, those regulating private 
economic activities or the status of aliens. It would appear from this that many--thought not all-- 
environmental agreements would, by their regulatory nature, involve some private interests. Those 
treaties would be interpretable by the courts. Of course, determining the "publicness" of an 
international obligations is not always a simple undertaking. 
The Cour de Cassation also subscribes to this public-private distinction. Overall, the interpretive 
role of the judiciary is seen as limited; in one case, the Cour de Cassation stated that 
international conventions are high-level administrative acts which can only be interpreted, when 
the occasion arises, by the authorities and powers between which they were concluded.95 
In general, French courts appear to avoid any controversial interpretive rulings. If the issue is 
deemed clear and unambiguous (anacte clair) then rulings without (formal) governmental 
consultation occur. If not, the relevant government ministry is asked to provide an interpretation of 
the treaty obligation or clause in question, which is then binding on the judge. This procedure 
90 J. Tallon, "The Constitution and the Courts in France" American Journal of Comparative Law 27 1979, 
pg. 567. 
91 Eisemann and Kessedjian, pg. 14. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Michael H Davis, "The Law-Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the US Supreme 
Court" American Journal of Comparative Law vol 34, 1 winter 1986, pg. 47 
94 de la Rochere, pgs. 49-50. 
95 Cass.crim. December 4 1975, Gaz Pal 1976 I 286, cited in de la Rochere, pg. 51. 
clearly grants the governing administration an enormous amount of freedom in interpreting treaty 
commitments to its liking. Thus, the government can impose its own interpretation of a treaty on the 
judiciary; this has occured in several  instance^.^^ The result is that in any conflict between French 
national interests and an international commitment, national interest can legally prevail. 
French courts have refused to rule on violations of treaty commitments due to legislative action 
(e.g. contradictory domestic statutes). The logic of this refusal turns on the issue (discussed in 
section II:4:C above) of reciprocity. The French constitution clearly states that the superiority of 
international obligations vis-a-vis domestic statutes only obtains when the obligation is 
reciprocated. The courts have argued that the determination of reciprocity is not theirs to make: 
... if the government takes no steps to denounce a convention of suspend its application, it is not up to 
the judges to determine whether the condition of reciprocity in relations between states is being 
respected...97 
Additionally, there are two doctrines in France which further insulate the executive from judicial 
review of its actions. The first is termed "the theory of exceptional circumstances" and allows the 
executive and administrative authorities to disregard the law, and therefore treaties, when 
national security is believed to be at stake. The second doctrine relates to "acts of 
governments"which are viewed to be beyond review. Though this doctrine is controversial, 
it still applies whenever the application of the government measure involves relations with a 
foreign power. In particular, the diplomatic activity of the government is generally regarded as 
beyond judicial control since it concerns the external relations of the 
Thus in France both actions by the executive and by the legislature seem in most cases to be safe 
from detrimental scrutiny by the judiciary. The result is a greater degree of executive freedom in 
both the making and the keeping of international commitments than is found in the US or almost 
any other Western power. The power of the executive to redescribe commitments to its liking is 
seemingly l i m i t l e ~ s . ~ ~  This is counterbalanced by constitutional guarantees of the primacy of 
international commitments--guarantees that are, however, irregularly invoked. Were these to be 
invoked more regularly, even more power would accrue to the executive via its treaty-making 
powers. 
D. I ta ly  
96 Cassese; pg. 408. 
97 Cass civ. 1st civ. ch. March 6, 1984 RCDIP 1985, 108, cited in de la Rochere pg. 46. 
98 Zoller, 1993; pg. 268. 
99 Cassese, pg. 408. 
The typical way international commitments are domesticated in Italy is by an ordinary statute 
which states that full implementation of the treaty is to occur from a particular date. The treaty 
itself is then attached in a schedule to the statute. This system of transformation poses some 
problems in interpretation. Should, and does, the judiciary apply the treaty provisions directly? 
The Italian courts generally does apply the treaty provisions directly, though there is some 
controversy over this practice.100 
In Italy treaties are given the same status as ordinary statutes. The ordinary courts make 
determinations relating to conflicts with ordinary legislation. They generally seek--as is common in 
all systems--to avoid conflict through creative interpretation. However, Italian courts can also 
define legislation implementing treaties, as well as the treaties themselves, as "special provisions 
in order that they may be considered as remaining in force in spite of the enactment of subsequent 
statutes."lol This bit of judicial gymanastics allow the Italian courts to avoid, in some instances, 
unilateral abrogation of a commitment. 
E. the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, as in the UK, all treaties are concluded by the Crown. Typically, the foreign 
minister and other relevant ministers conduct negotiations, and the Dutch Parliament (the States- 
General) gives or withholds approval, after the treaty has been translated into Dutch. As noted 
above, the Netherlands is unique among the cases in the privileged status granted international 
commitments, which overrule national law or even the constitution itself. Perhaps because of this 
strength accorded international law, Parliamentary control is tight. Dutch courts, following a 
separation of powers doctrine, are not empowered to question the validity of treaties (or ordinary 
legislation). Nor can they make determinations about conflicts between treaties and the 
constitution; conflicts mean that the treaty must pass with a 2/3 majority rather than a simple one. 
That decision is solely for the Parliament to make. 
The courts are also not empowered to determine whether a particular treaty is self-executing or 
not. That issue is a question of treaty law rather than Dutch law.lo2 For example, if the treaty 
appoints a certain body, e.g the ICJ, to make interpretive rulings, those rulings are deemed 
determinative. Only if the treaty contains no provisions for its interpretation can the courts make 
such rulings. At this stage, the powers of the Parliament appear minimal. Where the 
international treaty contains no express rules about interpretation, the courts have full interpretive 
powers, and need not--as in France, for example--refer to or consult with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or any other governmental body. 
loo Gaja; pg. 90. 
lo l  Ibid.; pg. 99. 
lo2 Schemers; pg. 115. 
When interpreting, the Dutch judicial system pays attention to working drafts (travaux 
preparatoires) and negotiating history, as well as the effect of the treaty commitment. Unlike 
Britain, where the judiciary will interpret a treaty as written even if the resulting effect appears 
to violate the intent of the treaty, Dutch courts take account of effects and preambular goals. The 
negotiating history plays an important role in determining the guiding intent of the treaty's 
drafters, as do interpretations of foreign and international courts. But the role of interpretation 
remains formally in the hands of the judiciary and not the in other branches of governments. There 
is no indication that the doctines of "acts of state," "political questions," or generalized judicial 
deference in foreign affairs--found in all the other cases examined in this study--exist in any 
substantial way in the Netherlands. 
F. Germany 
In Germany the executive has the vast majority of powers in foreign affairs. The Federal 
Executive has the exclusive power to negotiate, sign, ratify, and terminate treaties. The Bundestag 
and--in rare instances--the Bundesrat have consent power only. At times the Bundestag has given 
its consent to international commitments along with an interpretive statement. But as in many of 
the other parliamentary systems examined in this paper, the executive and the parliament are 
often linked by party, and as the government (typically)103 emerges from a majority coalition in 
the parliament dissent is muted. So the foreign relations powers of the executive are again very 
strong in Germany. 
Despite this strength, the German Constitution (the Basic Law) requires that even international 
relations be conducted under constitutional principles. The Federal Constitutional Court makes all 
judgements about constitutionality. Any purely domestic statute appearing later in time can 
overturn a treaty commitment, except in certain well specified issue-areas (see section II:4:F above). 
Any act of the executive is in theory reviewable by the courts, and the judge "applies treaties and 
interprets them without, in the event of doubt, having to consult the Federal Government on the 
meaning and implication of the wording."lo4 But the concept of deference to the executive in 
foreign affairs is also powerful in Germany; Hilf refers to it as a "'margin of appreciation'." An 
analog to the political questions doctrine, however, does not exist. Moreover, unlike Britain and 
France, the German judiciary cannot request binding advisory opinions from the relevant ministries. 
But the expressed opinions of the government and of individual ministers do carry weight.lo5 
When interpreting treaty commitments, German courts rely upon the negotiating history as well as 
the wording of the treaty itself. When an international commitment is sent to the legislature for 
lo3 Minority governments are more common than generally thought. Grand coalitions occur when all parties 
are involved in  the government. 
lo4 Treviranus and Beemelmans; pg. 53. 
lo5 Frowein; pg. 85. 
approval, it is accompanied by a detailed description of the treaty, its history, and its aims. 
Courts generally refer to this description when passing judgements. German courts also, as is the 
practice in the Netherlands, refer to interpretations made by foreign and international courts. 
IV Standing and Access to Challenge Government Action 
The comparisons undertaken above all concern elements of constitutional design relating to the 
actions of governments and to the balance of duties and power between branches of govemment in the 
process of domesticating treaty commitments. This final category of comparison is different, in that 
it involves private or societal actors. Specifically, the question at hand in this section is: to what 
degree can private actors challenge or force government action pursuant to an intemational 
commitment? What are the rules of standing for such challenges in each of the cases--in other 
words, who can challenge government action pursuant to a treaty commitment-or, more often, who 
can challenge government action pursuant to a statute hcorvoratin~ a treaty commitment? As we 
will discover, most foreign relations actions are deemed non-justiciable by courts, and are insulated, 
to varying degrees, from review. But implementing statutes--where they occur--are typically 
ordinary statutory law, and subject to standard review procedures. 
"Standing" refers in practice to a legal right to take action in a court. To have standing is to have 
"a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judical resolution of that 
controversy."106 In the words of US Supreme Court Justice Scalia, to grant standing is to ask 
"what's it to you?"107 
Issues of standing in relation to treaty commitments are but a tiny part of the standing rules of any 
judicial system. Frequently, and in particular when treaties are deemed self-executing, there is no 
standing to sue the govemment for a failure to adhere to international commitments. In keeping 
with the deference of judges in matters of foreign affairs, judicial oversight is less common in these 
areas than in almost any others. Courts have developed a panoply of "avoidance techniques"l08 in 
dealing with international affairs. But when commitments have been transformed into domestic 
enabling legislation, that legislation typically falls under the general rules of administrative law. 
In these cases challenge becomes more possible. 
Standing rules are therefore important factors in the making and keeping of intemational 
commitments in that they may, by empowering private actors to take legal action against 
governments, shape compliance and implementation. Broader rules of standing would presumably 
yield greater compliance with international commitments. This is particularly so if the rules allow 
standing for "genera1ized"and difficult to quantify and cost injuries, such as the loss of 
lo6 US Supreme Court, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 US 727, 731 (1972). 
lo7 Cited in Christopher Sprigman, "Standing on Firmer Ground: Separation of Powers and Deference to 
Congressional Findings in the Standing Analysis," University of Chicago Law Review 59 (1992) 
log Kratochwil; passim. 
environmental amenities. Standing rules are also important for another reason. Where domestic 
legislation addressing a particular environmental concern exists ex ante, and generous standing rules 
make it likely that organizations can successfully force governmental enforcement of that 
legislation, governments may seek to "internationalize" that legislation in any effort to avoid any 
competitive advantages which may accrue to other states.lo9 In this way--by in essence 
strengthening compliance with national law--broad rules of standing may encourage certain states 
to pursue international agreements, but only if stricter (than average) domestic legislation already 
exists or is expected in the near term. 
1. Cross-national rules of standin5 
The countries examined here vary in both their rules of standing--e.g. who can bring challenge?-- 
and in their judicial structure--what is the venue for the challenge? In the English and American 
systems review has been mainly entrusted to the regular courts system. In the American system, 
most administrative law challenges occur at the circuit level in the Washington, DC Circuit court. 
France and Germany, with a civil law tradition, have a separate system of courts dedicated to 
administrative matters.l1° In France, these courts are actually part of the administration itself, 
and not part of the judiciary. So while these courts are in many ways separate from the active 
administrative apparatus, they are still part of the administration and therefore "judicial 
review" a bit of a misnomer. 
A. The US 
The US has arguably the broadest and most inclusive rules of standing among the cases examined 
here in the field of administrative law, though recent changes in the British system have 
substantially expanded standing doctrine in certain classes of cases.ll1 In the US, a traditional test 
of standing was whether a litigant's personal stake in a case or controversy ensured "that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."112 Later court decisionsl13 further refined the 
standing test: at a minimum, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal injury or threatened injury, a 
link between the alleged injury and the action in question, and redressability: the ability of judicial 
lo9 This dynamic was at work in the US push for a CFC accord in the 1980s. Prior legislation (the Clean Air 
Act) mandated that the EPA administrator was to regulate CFCs if a "reasonable anticipation of hann" existed. 
This standard, coupled with broad rules of standing, encourage the US to seek a strict multilateral accord which 
would mimic the domestic rules already present in the US. 
lo For a discussion of the differences the common law and civil law traditions have wrought in the area of 
administrative law, see Gerd-Michael Hellstern, "When Courts Intervene: Judicial Control in a Comparative 
Institutional Perspective" 
The following builds upon that offered in Cass Sunstein, "Whats Left Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen- 
suits, 'Injuries,' and Article 111" Michigan Law Review 9 1 (1992). 
l2  Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83,99(1968), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186,204 (1962). 
l3 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church and State, 454 US 464 (1982). 
action to actually do something positive about the injury. It is important to note that injury is 
"creatable" by Congress: if Congress, through statutory language, deems a particular state of being 
(e.g., a given level of ambient pollution) or action to be injurious, the courts will accept that and not 
attempt to actually discern a physical injury. Injuries can thus be concrete, in the sense of physical 
and obvious to a reasonable observer, or they can be non-concrete but a product of legislation. 
Congressional actions are therefore crucial to understanding standing doctrine in the US. Two 
important aspects of the Congressional influence on standing and participation stand out: the 
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, which governs administrative actions in the US, and the 
existence and creation of citizen-suit provisions, or "private attorneys general" c1auses.l l4 The 
APA codified standing rules in administrative challenges. The APA also guaranteed that citizen- 
suit provisions, which allow private individuals or groups to bring suit against agencies (and other 
private actors) for failing to comply or enforce the law as written, were legitimate grants of 
standing. These sorts of provisions are particularly common in areas--like the environment--where 
Congress does not trust the executive branch to execute or enforce the law to its liking. 
In most cases administrative remedies must first be exhausted before judicial remedies are 
attempted.115 When such remedies fail, the lenient rules of standing have allowed for many 
challenges to agency actions in the US during the last several decades--and thereby frequently 
greater compliance with the law.l16 In the last two years, however, standing doctrine has been 
rocked by new thinking on the Court. In 1992, in a major case bemoaned by many environmental 
NGOs (and others), the Court significantly diminished standing for plaintiffs who only claim a 
generalized injury from an action which is indistinguishable from the public's interest in the proper 
administration of the law.l17 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife concerned the extraterritorial reach 
of the Endangered Species Act, an act that contains citizen-suit provisions. The plaintiffs claimed 
that a new regulation, by limiting the need for federal agencies to adhere to the ESA in overseas 
projects, would compromise their interests in returning to sites of endangered species (in this case, 
Sri Lanka and Egypt) in order to view them. To compress greatly, theLujan decision argued first 
that the simple assertion of a desire to see particular species in the wild was too vague to qualify as 
On the APA and administrative law more generally see Richard Stewart, "The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law" Harvard Law Review 88 (1975); 
Keith Werhan, "The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law" Adminis tra t ive  
Law Review 44 (Summer 1992); Robert Glicksman and Christopher Schroeder, "EPA 
and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law Politics" Law and Contemporary Problems 5 4 
(1991). 
l5 P. van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirement of an Interest to Sue (Sijthoff 
and Noordhoff: 1980); chap. 3. 
l6 Laura Bulatao, "Citizen-suits under the United States' Clean Water Act," in Martin Fuhr and Gerhard Roller, 
eds., Participation and Litigation Rights of Environmental Associations in Europe (XX) 
l 7  Sprigman, 1992 pg. 7 (lexis-nexis file). 
an injury, and second that while Congress can empower private actors to commence suit on their own 
behalf, 
vindicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive ... to permit 
Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the 
law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the 
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, "to take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully implemented." 
Thus Lujan--in addition to overturning perhaps hundreds of statutes containing such broad grants of 
standing118--severely restricted standing to challenge executive actions by invoking the separation 
of powers doctrine. The court's claim was that the President was constitutionally-empowered to 
"faithfully" execute the law, and therefore Congress could not grant standing to individuals merely 
to ensure such faithful execution. Standing is to be restricted to more concrete and specific sorts of 
injuries. 
This somewhat long digression on the Lujan case is justified by two insights it yields. The first is 
general: standing rules in the US, as elsewhere, are rarely "rules" in the sense of codified law 
(though sometimes, as in the APA, they in part are), and moreover when they are codified they are 
still subject to extensive interpretation by the courts. Standing tends to evolve over time, unlike 
ratification rules which tend to be constitutionally-mandated and thereby relatively fixed. More 
specifically, while the US has long been famous for its depth and breadth of participation rights 
and standing doctrines, Lujan has severely limited standing in many cases with environmental 
content. It has done so by demanding more strictly than in the past an "injury-in-fact," something 
hard to demonstrate in many instances where the preservation of environmental quality, or 
diversity, is at issue, and it has done so by restricting the use of citizen-suits in instances where 
private claims of injury approximate the public interest in compliance and faithful execution. This 
would appear to apply both to instances where the executive is challenged and to instances where 
private actors, such as firms, are sued for failure to adhere to the law. 
As a final note, US courts have been quite willing to extend their reach extra-territorially, in the 
process often granting standing to foreign nationals under US statutes.l19 
B. The UK 
While judicial review of administrative action is certainly known in the UK, rules of standing 
are not generally as broad as those of the US, particularly in relation to the pre-Lujan US--though 
l8 Sunstein, 1992. 
l9 Michael McCloskey, "Extra-territorial adjudication: a means to an end," in Simone Bilderbeek, ed., 
Biodiversity and International Law (10s Press: 1992) pg. 15 1 .  
standing doctrine has evolved substantially in recent years.120 In the UK, "it cannot be said that 
any form of judicial review may be exercised in relation to any adminstrative agency ... there are 
considerable restrictions specifically with regard to the Crown and its officials."121 These 
restrictions, perhaps unsurprisingly, revolve around issues of foreign relations. As noted above, 
foreign relations and intercourse with other sovereign nations has always been among the 
prerogative powers of the Crown, and therefore somewhat removed from popular control and access. 
The restrictions on judicial challenge include, among others, "acts of state," which are basically all 
foreign relations acts including the making of treaties. Moreover, all acts of Parliament, due to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, are in principle unreviewable. 
While Parliamentary acts themselves are unreviewable, if Parliament delegates legislative 
powers--which includes the making of rules, regulations, and the like--this delegated legislation 
is reviewable to determine if the delegatee acted within its powers, i.e. within the terms of the 
-
delegation.122 The drawback to this form of administrative review is that delegated powers in 
the UK are frequently vague and broad, making a claim of ultra vires action--action beyond the 
delegated powers--quite difficult to sustain. The Parliament can moreover bar judicial review 
when it wants to (via statute). But unlike the US, when review does occur, there is no demand that 
all administrative remedies be vainly tried before coming to the courts. 
Thus judicial review in the UK is generally limited to determinations of whether administrative 
bodies have acted within their powers. When making such determinations, the courts may also--to 
some degree--test whether the acts concerned are in conformity with customary laws of "natural 
justice"l23 such as the weighing of legally-protected interests, impartial decision-making, and 
opportunities for effected interests to plead on their behalf prior to decision-making. The discretion 
of the courts to award or not to award standing--and a remedy--is very broad. There is no analog in 
the British system to the American APA, keeping with the British penchant for unwritten rules. 
The British judicial system responds differently to challenges based on governmental action 
rather than inaction. In cases where the courts are asked to prohibit some action, both "persons 
aggrieved" and "strangersw--persons unaffected by the action but interested solely out of concern 
with the observance of the law by the government--can be granted standing. Discretion to grant 
standing is much greater in the latter than in the former, but it may be granted. This is quite 
distinct from the view taken by the US Supreme Court in Lujan (see above); indeed, it espouses the 
120 For an analysis of recent changes in British administrative law see Bernard Schwartz, Lions Over the 
Throne: The Judicial Revolution in English Administrarive Law (New York: NYU Press, 1987). Much of the 
"revolution" is in areas tangentially related at best to environmental regulation--in part because regulation is seen 
as something distinct from law. And in the key area of mandamus the revolution has barely taken hold; 
Schwartz, pgs. 103-4. 
121 van Dijk, pg. 39. See also ibid. 
122 Ibid., 38. 
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very opposite position. Those with a general pubic interest and no specific, "individualized" 
private interests are still eligible for standing. Of course, the basis of the decision in Lujan was the 
constitutional separation of powers, a basis wholly lacking in the UK. 
In cases where the court is asked to force some action to occur, standing rules are quite tight. In 
the opinion of one analyst, in Great Britainthe non-performance of a public duty seems to be 
regarded as less of an offence than against public order than the unlawful exercise of power."124 
Here a special, individualized interest must be shown. 
When organizations bring challenge--as is more typically the case than individuals bringing 
challenge--the requirement that an injury or interest be individualized is not very strong. As a 
result, it is relatively easy for organizations to stand up for the interests of some or all of their 
members. 
C .  France 
In France the administrative courts are under the aegis of the administration itself. However, 
they are argued to remain fairly independent, though this is hard to prove.125 The most important 
body for challenges arising under treaty commitments is the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil has 
jurisdiction over all disputes arising outside French territory in addition to those where the act in 
question applies beyond any one prefect in France. These conditions would appear to apply to all 
international environmental commitments. 
However, in France all "acts of governmentu--in a similar fashion to the British doctrine of acts of 
state--are deemed unreviewable. Acts of government include administrative acts which affect 
foreign relations and relations with international organizations, and further include the conclusion, 
ratification, and interpretation of treaties.126 In Britain, the insulation from challenge that the 
acts of state doctrine produces is attentuated somewhat by the practice of rewriting each treaty as 
an Act of Parliament when domesticating it. The treaty commitment therefore becomes statutory 
domestic law, and, if it has some form of delegation inherent, should in principle be reviewable. In 
France, however, while the legislature approves most major international commitments, "there is 
no room ... for the 'reception' of international law into domestic law. To become applicable, an 
international agreement needs only one formality, publication."127 Treaty commitments do not 
become acts of the French legislature, but rather gain effect through publication once they have 
received legislative approval, if necessary. Thus the acts of government doctrine in France--because 
of the nature of French treaty domestication--appears to effectively shield administrative acts 
relating to treaty commitments from review. 
124 HWR Wade, Administrative Law (3rd Edition) (Oxford Press: 1971) pg. 159. 
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D. Italy 
I was unable to obtain reliable data at IIASA on Italian standing rules. 
E.  The Netherlands 
Data (available at IIASA) on the Netherlands was limited, but it terms of ease of standing 
regarding citizen organizations it appears that Dutch NGOs which are legally incorporated can 
gain standing to challenge government actions, as long as the action in question impacts a declared 
aim or interest of the organization as reflected in its charter.lZ8 In this sense Dutch courts do not 
seein to demand the sort of well-focussed, individualized harm characteristic of American courts. 
F .  Germany 
Data on German standing doctrine was similarly limited. Unlike in the Netherlands, German 
organizations cannot simply gain standing based on the proclamation of an interest in a particular 
goal or subject in their charters.lZ9 German law demands a more well-focussed, individualized 
harm, similar to that of demanded by American courts. At the Lander level, however, standing 
rules vis-a-vis organizations are often more relaxed, but while the Lander do have the power to 
engage in certain limited types of international commitments these commitments tend to be 
relatively unimportant. 
V Conclusions: Institutional Variations and State Behavior 
The goal of this working paper has been to examine the processes by which international 
commitments are domesticated in different nations--how they are transformed from international to 
domestic law--and to explore how rules of ratification, interpretation, and standing might 
systematically affect implementation and compliance with international commitments. I have 
identified a number of interesting variations in the domestication process across the cases surveyed. 
In this final section, I will briefly survey the most salient differences, and then discuss the possible 
implications of these differences for implementation and compliance. 
1. Maior Variations in Domestication 
One danger in all comparative analysis is an undue focus on distinctions rather than similarities. 
The first thing one notices in surveying cross-national domestication of international commitments is 
that despite many variations in detail the general characteristics of the process remain constant 
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across the cases. No nation (in the sample) seems to have devised a radically different method of 
incorporating international law than that used by the others. The basic outline of the process is: 
i. executive [occasionally in conjunction with elements of the legislature] negotiates---> 
ii. if the treaty has direct effect, it automatically becomes domestic law. if not---> 
iii. the legislature, or some subset of it, votes on the treaty and/or writes implementing legislation 
which transforms the commitments into domestic law. 
Variations occur primarily in the nature of the implementing legislation--e.g., does it alter the 
language of the treaty commitment?--and in the status of the resulting law--does it have priority 
over ordinary legislation?--with status being particularly important. 
Issues of interpretation and standing, while not aspects of domestication per se, were examined 
because they effect both the meaninc and the control of international commitments once they have 
entered the realm of domestic law. Hence, they may be expected to affect compliance and 
implementation. Here variations revolved primarily around the degree of insulation of the 
executive from review and the degree to which treaty-related harms must be well-focussed to 
justify legal challenge. 
A. The Nature of implementing Legislation and its Status 
The priority accorded treaty commitments vis-a-vis ordinary legislation was found to vary 
widely in the cases examined.130 The modal position, shared by the US, the UK, and Italy, is that 
once domesticated or transformed a treaty commitment is accorded the same status as any other 
piece of legislation emerging from the political process. As a result, in these nations treaty 
commitments enshrined in domestic law can be easily overturned by a contrary statute enacted at a 
later date. As the (US) D.C Circuit Court held in Diggs v. Shultz, "Under our constitutional 
scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit ... and there is nothing the other branches can do 
about it."131 The same can be said of the British and Italian parliaments. 
A strikingly different position on status is found in Dutch law. Here treaty commitments are 
accorded a higher status than ordinary legislation, and can even have a higher status than the 
Dutch constitution itself if 2/3 of the States-General (the legislature) approves. It is noteworthy 
that in the US this is precisely the proportion of the Senate that is required to merely ratify a 
130 This may in part be an artifact of the sample; Cassese, employing a much broader sample with more limited 
detail, argues that "one result of my enquiry is of a primarily negative character: most of the States (about 160) 
which currently make up the workd community do not accord primacy to international rules in their legal 
systems."(emp. in original). Cassese, pg. 435. 
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treaty. Yet in the Netherlands, the very basis of the political system--the constitution itself--can 
be altered via treaty approval by 2/3 of the representatives. 
Germany and France occupy a middle ground. In Germany treaties which address tax law, 
treatment of aliens, extradition, or police cooperation do recieve a higher status than ordinary law. 
But all others do not, and clearly the most important international commitments fall outside the 
limited categories enumerated above. In France, the 1958 constitution accords treaties a higher 
status than ordinary statute law, similar to that found in the Netherlands though without the 
"constitution-tmmping" provision. But in practice, the evidence indicates that French courts for a 
long period--and possibly still today--failed to uniformly apply this doctrine, and as a result later 
ordinary legislation often does take priority over international commitments, particularly under 
the jurisdiction of theconseil d'Etat. While some analysts indicate that French courts are moving 
in the direction of enforcing the constitution on this issue, and granting a higher status to 
international commitments in the event of a conflict, it is not clear that this view is absolutely 
correct. It is also important to note that the French constitution privileges international 
commitments only if they are reciprocated by the other parties. This clause provides one pathway 
of "escape" from onerous commitments. 
Only Italy appears to incorporate treaty language directly into its domesticating legislation as a 
matter of practice. In all the other cases (except possibly the Netherlands, where the evidence is 
ambiguous) the treaty language tends to undergo some, occasionally extensive, revision in the 
process of transformation. The implications of such a revision-process are discussed below. 
Finally, it should be noted that Cassese, in a broader study, categorizes the Western states, in 
contrast to developing and Socialist states, as having a greater preponderance of constitutions 
"markedly geared to the international community." Thus the degree to which international treaty 
law is given a constitutionally-guaranteed privileged status--which as indicated by the preceding 
survey is often substantially undermined by counter-clauses, loopholes, and actual practice-- 
appears strongly influenced the by the nature of the sample of nations chosen. This study, looking 
at OECD states only, as a result may paint a relatively bright picture for the domestic legal force 
of international commitments that should not be casually generalized to the world at large. The 
present system of international law is a creature of the West and therefore western states are likely 
to be especially deferential and conscientious in their treatment of international obligations. To 
give but one cautionary example, albeit of great and growing import, China's 1982 Constitution 
barely addresses international law at all. No mention is made of treaties, customary law, or 
international organizations of any kind.l32 
B. Interpretation 
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The variance within the cases regarding the interpretation of commitments is more limited. It 
occurs mainly on two dimensions: the degree to which interpretation is concentrated in or primarily 
influenced by the executive, and the degree to which the treaty itself, vs. the language of 
implementing legislation, guides interpretation. 
In general, in all the cases surveyed foreign relations and treaty-making are considered 
somewhat special areas in which the executive has a substantial degree of expertise and control. 
All of the judicial systems surveyed have a relatively strong tradition of deference to the executive 
branch in international affairs. This deference appears to be a residue of the overwhelming 
security focus of international relations in the pre-World War I1 period. One can speculate, but not 
with assurance, that this deference will erode in the future as non-security concerns grow in 
importance within international affairs. 
In the US, deference to the executive is attenuated somewhat by the constitutionally-guaranteed 
power of the Senate in foreign relations. The Senate's interpretation of a treaty is important 
because under American law it is that interpretation that actually matters: the Senate's 
understanding, when granting consent, is the US' understanding. Once an international treaty 
commitment becomes domestic law, however, it is the Supreme Court which is the ultimate arbiter. 
The executive in the US, as a result, has less control over interpretation than executives in the other 
cases. In the UK, the courts grant substantial deference to the executive (formally to the Crown, but 
in actuality to the Cabinet, the Crown's ministers). 
In France the executive has perhaps the greatest power. In the past French courts routinely 
relied upon interpretations provided by relevant ministries, and these still have great weight 
today. Under the French constitution commitments are binding only if they are reciprocated. The 
courts have resisted ruling on unilateral abrogations of treaty commitments, on the grounds that 
they are in no position to determine whether the treaty is in fact being reciprocated. Since only the 
executive is well-positioned to determine whether other parties to an international commitment 
are actually reciprocating fully the executive's power to interpret is further enhanced by this 
constitutional provision. 
Another important distinction can be drawn between Italy and the other cases. In Italy, treaty 
commitments are typically domesticated via a special statute stating that "the following treaty 
shall be implemented" with the treaty itself contained in an appendix. In the other cases, the 
treaty commitments are generally rewritten when the implementing legislation is drafted. This 
practice of rewriting can cause problems of interpretation when the wording of an international 
commitment is altered, or even when the actual commitments themselves are altered, as has 
recently happened in the US with the implementing legislation for the newly-created World 
Trade While judges will generally attempt to reconcile domestic and 
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international language, in a controversy domestic courts will almost always follow the domestic 
and not the international language, which can result in a failure to comply with a treaty 
commitment. 
C .  Standing 
The brief review of standing rules demonstrated that the US has the broadest access and the 
strongest tradition of judicial review in the cases examined. While the Lujan case has tightened 
standing rules, there are still ample and well-formalized modes of access for individuals and groups 
seeking to challenge government actions pursuant to a treaty commitment. The chief effect of Lujan 
has been to require that alleged harms be more well-focussed in the sense that an individual has 
suffered a real and individuated harm and is not just seeking that the law be properly executed. In 
the UK, while judical review is in some respects more limited, there is conversely no demand that 
standing be based on an individualized harm; indeed, there is a long tradition of granting standing 
to "strangers." In France, the doctrine of "acts of stateM--referring to government acts which are 
deemed non-justiciable--makes challenge exceedingly difficult and again serves to insulate the 
executive. The power of the French executive in international affairs is perhaps the result of the 
confluence of two powerful traditions in French politics: the democratic, as embodied in the early 
Revolution, and the dictatorial, or "Bonapartist." The democratic ensures a suspicion of elitist 
judical review, and the Bonapartist--as embodied in the Gaullist constitution of 1958--grants 
substantial powers to the President, especially in foreign affairs. The result is that judical 
challenge of government action pursuant to a treaty commitment, by citizens or citizen groups, is 
extremely difficult to mount. 
Regarding standing for organizations, the US and Germany require fairly well-focussed harm to 
individual members of an organization for that organization to obtain standing. Conversely, the 
Netherlands allows any group which can show an interest reflected in its charter of principles and 
goals to bring challenge. The UK also is quite open to groups seek to vindicate fairly diffuse 
interests. 
2. Implications and hypotheses 
Some basic hypotheses can be generated linking the institutional variations summarized above 
with state behavior relating to compliance and implementation. One barrier to effective 
hypothesis-generation is that the sample of cases in this paper was necessarily limited, 
institutional design features varied along many dimensions, and a number of the variables of 
interest appear to work at cross-purposes. Hypotheses therefore have to be carefully drawn. 
Nevertheless, the following very simple hypotheses may serve as fruitful starting points for future 
research on compliance, implementation, and international commitments. 
Based on the status of the environmental treaty commitments in the Netherlands, vs. their status 
in the US, UK, Germany and Italy, we should expect that compliance (with the same treaties) will 
be tend to be higher in the Netherlands than in the other cases. This is because later legislation 
cannot legally overturn international commitments in the Netherlands, whereas it can in other 
countries. As a result, in the Netherlands it is more difficult to legally breach an international 
commitment. The first hypothesis is therefore: 
i. The Netherlands should exhibit a higher level of compliance with shared international 
commitments than the US, the UK, Germany, or Italy. 
A corollary hypothesis is that other states which grant priority to international commitments 
should also exhibit relatively high levels of compliance. 
A second hypothesis relates to the nature of the implementing legislation. Since Italy is the only 
state in the sample to uniformly incorporate the treaty text directly into its "act of transformation," 
we should expect Italy to exhibit greater levels of compliance than the UK, US, or Germany for the 
same international commitments. Because the other states often rewrite commitments when 
domesticating them, there is more room for advertant or inadvertant alterations which may result 
in breaches and therefore challenges by other parties. While variations in compliance levels may 
be difficult to capture due to the perturbing effects of other variables, such as standing rules, we 
should expect that: 
ii. Italy should be the object of dispute proceedings, or challenges by other parties, less frequently 
than the US, UK, or Germany in situations where commitments are shared among these states. 
We can make a dyadic comparison between the two most avowedly dualist countries: the UiI and 
the US. Both nations strongly favor the primacy of national law, and legislative action, over 
international law. But the US has broader rules of standing and a clear and constitutionally- 
guaranteed disperation of power. As a result, we may expect it to be easier for the British 
government to breach an international commitment without internal challenge than for the 
American government: 
iii. Given shared international commitments, the US should exhibit higher levels of compliance 
than the UK, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, though France and Netherlands share similar constitutional provisions regarding the 
primacy of international commitments, the French executive, responsible for carrying out these 
commitments, is much more insulated. Thus we should expect: 
iv. France should more frequently (than the Netherlands) renege or fail to properly implement 
those commitments shared wi th  the Netherlands 
These hypotheses are clearly limited and difficult to subject to rigorous testing. While they may 
provide subjects for futher research, as is discussed below they also point to the difficulties and 
pitfalls associated with an overly legalistic approach to compliance and implementation. 
3. n 
This study's survey of the domestication of international commitments in six advanced industrial 
nations has uncovered a number of institutional variations of interest to scholars of international 
cooperation, and should prove useful to those performing case studies of implementation and 
compliance in any of the countries surveyed. 
While I have generated several hypotheses linking institutional legal factors with compliance 
(see above), it is not clear that many useful systematic conclusions along these lines can be drawn. A 
major hindrance is a lack of degrees of freedom in the statistical sense: I have uncovered many 
variables within few cases, and it would be futile to attempt to discern any clear relations because 
the probability of omitted variable bias--of overlooking the truly important causal factors--would 
be very high. Indeed, one result of this study is to affirm the complexity of the nexus of law, 
politics, and treaty-making. There are so many factors at work, often in ways that are probably 
unknowable to the researcher (in any reasonable sense) that few meaningful generalizations 
relating institutional design to behavioral outcomes are possible. 
As a result, one major conclusion is to reaffirm the poverty of a purely formal analysis of 
institutions. While formal rules--or written rules--undoubtedly matter, they differ from informal 
rules only in their clarity and the degree to which they can be assumed "common knowledge." The 
have no other differentiating power beyond this. Yet informal rules abound, and as the analysis 
has shown (France being a paradigmatic example), in practice informal rules can often effectively 
trump or at least swamp formal rules. Informal rules, as well as understandings and reading of 
formal rules, are moreover constantly in evolution. What this means is that there are no easy ways 
to understand state legal practice towards international commitments; a careful and intensive study 
of case law, actual practice, and field research is necessary. This will be difficult and costly-- 
especially if done comparatively--and may not be worth the effort in many cases of interest. The 
studies that do exist, on which this paper relied heavily, are quite cursory, often contradictory, are 
written by legal scholars for a legal audience, and typically ignore informal rules and procedures 
except where they have major, unavoidable effects. 
A second major, and related, conclusion is that one must question the importance of formal 
legalitywhen evaluating implementation and effectiveness at the domestic level. This issue is the 
heart of a number of major debates about international law and b e h a ~ i 0 r . l ~ ~  Beginning with the 
assumption that international law mattered--a contested assumption in some quarters--this study 
sought to look at the modes and methods that transformed international into domestic law. This 
move was based on a second (safer) assumption that domestic law matters more, or is more powerful, 
than international law. Yet the complexity of both formal rules and actual practice in the creation 
and implementation of international agreements raises doubts about the importance--and even the 
ascertainability--of legality regarding national behavior pursuant to international commitments. 
What governments actually do regarding commitments they have undertaken appears to depend on 
a number factors of which the legality or illegality of the action is but one. Legality--and here I 
refer to legality under domestic or constitutional law and procedure regarding international 
commitments--is not completely irrelevant but it is not decisive or unambiguous either. 
Thirdly, many of the variations uncovered in this study appear to reflect variations in the 
fundamental organizing principles of politics held by each society; they are the institutional 
sediment of differing political philosphies. That the wide array of institutional variations in 
domestication do not facially appear to result in equally wide behavioral variations is in large 
part due to the uniform insulation of the conduct of foreign affairs within the executive. This 
insulation attentuates the effects of institutional differences, especially in the implementation 
stage. To speculate somewhat, we may expect to see these institutional variations play a more 
important role in the future. As international affairs increasingly encroach upon policymaking 
provinces which traditionally fell solely within the ambit of domestic decisionmaking, the need 
for greater constitutional checks upon foreign affairs--and less insulation--will become more 
apparent. The warrant for insulation--national security--is less and less the major goal of foreign 
relations, and commitments of a military or alliance nature, which once were the dominant form of 
international commitment, are now only a small part of the panoply of commitments undertaken by 
nations. As such, and as the effects of international commitments impinge more upon our lives and 
lifestyles, we may expect a greater demand that the making, keeping and carrying out of 
commitments no longer be so sheltered under the twin doctrines of judicial and legislative deference. 
Such a "de-sheltering" should enhance the role of the institutional differences which this paper 
has described. 
In sum, the chief utility of this study will likely lay in its 
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overview of the domestication process in six major states; 
indication of the diversity, complexity, and the functional similarity of national systems for 
making and incorporating international commitments; 
reaffirmation of the poverty of a purely formal analysis of institutions; and 
questioning of the importance of legality as a factor in state behavior regarding international 
commitments. 
Given the possibility (perhaps probability) that domestication procedures will matter more in the 
future than presently, the best prescription for this avenue of research is "hold and wait." While 
futher work in this vein is not justified at the moment, as the nature of agreements and their 
implementation grow more complex the significance of these factors may and most likely will need 
to be re-explored. 
